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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM-46
MARCH 17, 1978
Presidential Review Memorandum NSCM/46
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement
The President has directed that a comprehensive review be made of current
developments in Black Africa from the point of view of their possible impacts
on the black movement in the United States. The review should consider:
1. Long-term tendencies of social and political developments and the degree to
which they are consistent with or contradict the U.S. interests.
2. Proposals for durable contacts between radical African leaders and leftist
leaders of the U.S. black community.
3. Appropriate steps to be taken inside and outside the country in order to
inhibit any pressure by radical African leaders and organizations on the U.S.
black community for the latter to exert influence on the policy of the
Administration toward Africa.
The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa
perform this review. The review should be forwarded to the NSC Political
Analysis Committee by April 20.
(signed)
Zbigniew Brezinski
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Attorney General
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
FOR AFRICA
STUDY RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
REVIEW MEMORANDUM NSC-46
BLACK AFRICA AND THE
U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT
Objective of our policy toward Black Africa is to prevent social upheavals which
could radically change the political situation throughout the area. The success
or failure of our policy in the region depends on the solution international
and internal issues whose importance of the United States is on the increase.
II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA
A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa.
The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:
1. POLITICAL
If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest,
our policy toward the white regimes; which is a key element in our relations
with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for
fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of
access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are vital
for our defense needs as well as losing control over the Cape sea routes by
which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe.
Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by
intensifying the activity of the black movement in the United States itself.
It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a
continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate
infrastructures, drought, and famine, are constant features of the scene. In
conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers,
guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in
South Africa, the above factors provide the communist states with ample
opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the
detriment of U.S. political interests.
2. ECONOMIC
Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment.
The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal
functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S.
direct investment in black Africa totaled about $1.8 billion and exports $2.2
billion. New prospect of substantial profits would continue to develop in the
countries concerned.
IV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT
Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the
nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far
reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its
organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result
would be likely as Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.
An occurrence of the events of 1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige,
especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human
rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to
stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and
outside the United States.
In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests,
it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.
1. Possibility of Joint Action By U.S. Black and African Nationalist Movement.
In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the
fact that there are 25 millions American blacks whose roots are African and who
consciously or subconsciously sympathies with African nationalism.
The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account.
Immense advances in the field are accompanied by a long-lasting high rate of
unemployment, especially among the youth and by poverty and dissatisfaction with
government social welfare standards.
These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete
nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community.
Basically, actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests,
but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be attempts
to coordinate their political activity both locally and in international
organizations.
Inside the United States these actions could include protest demonstrations
against our policy toward South Africa accompanied by demand for boycotting
corporations and banks which maintain links with that country; attempts to
establish a permanent black lobby in Congress including activist leftist radical
groups and black legislators; the reemergence of Pan-African ideals; resumption
of protest marches recalling the days of Martin Luther King; renewal of the
extremist idea national idea of establishing an "African Republic" on American
soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the black community could resume
extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black Panther Party.
Internationally, damage could be done to the United States by coordinated
activity of African states designed to condemn U.S. policy toward South Africa,
and initiate discussions on the U.S. racial issue at the United Nations where
the African representation constitutes a powerful bloc with about one third of
all the votes.
A menace to U.S. economic interests, though not a critical one, could be posed
by a boycott by Black African states against American companies which maintain
contact with South Africa and Rhodesia. If the idea of economic assistance to
black Americans shared by some African regimes could be realized by their
placing orders in the United States mainly with companies owned by blacks, they
could gain a limited influence on the U.S. black community.
In the above context, we must envisage the possibility, however remote, that
black Americans interested in African affairs may refocus their attention on the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking into account; the African descent of American
blacks it is reasonable to anticipate that their sympathies would lie with the
Arabs who are closer to them in spirit and in some case related to them by
blood. Black involvement in lobbying to support the Arabs may lead to serious
dissention between American black and Jews. The likelihood of extremist actions
by either side is negligible, but the discord may bring about tension in the
internal political climate of the United States.
3. Political options
In the context of long-term strategy, the United States can not afford a radical
change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed for maximum
protection of national security. In the present case, emphasis is laid on the
importance of Black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In weighing the range of U.S. interests in Black Africa, basic recommendations
arranged without intent to imply priority are:
1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government
agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the Black Movement in the United
States.
2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate
mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity of
the two forces, and to cause division among Black African radical national
groups and their leaders.
3. U.S. embassies to Black African countries specially interested in southern
Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain political
circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and methods of U.S.
policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the failure of U.S.
strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American standing throughout the
world. In addition, this would mean a significant diminution of U.S. influence
in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties in our internal situation due to
worsening economic prospects.
4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against Black African
representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the
U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should include
facts on their links with the leaders of the Black movement in the United
States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the adverse
effects of their activity.
V. TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MOVEMENT
In connection with our African policy, it is highly important to evaluate
correctly the present state of the Black movement in the Untied States and
basing ourselves on all available information, to try to devise a course for its
future development. Such an approach is strongly suggested by our perception of
the fact that American Blacks form a single ethnic group potentially capable of
causing extreme instability in our strategy toward South Africa. This may lead
to critical differences between the United States and Black Africa in
particular. It would also encourage the Soviet Union to step up its interference
in the region. Finally, it would pose a serious threat to the delicate structure
of race relations within the United States. All the above considerations give
rise to concern for the future security of
the United States.
Since the mid-1960s, when legislation on the human rights was passed and Martin
Luther King murdered, federal and local measures to improve black welfare have
been taken, as a result of which the U.S. black movement has undergone
considerable changes.
The principle changes are as follows:
*Social and economic issues have supplanted political aims as the main
preoccupations of the movement. and actions formerly planned on a nationwide
scale are now being organized locally.
*Fragmentation and a lack of organizational unity within the movement.
*Sharp social stratification of the Black population and lack of policy options
which could reunite them.
*Want of a national leader of standing comparable to Martin Luther King.
B. THE RANGE OF POLICY OPTIONS
The concern for the future security of the United States makes necessary the
range of policy options. Arranged without intent imply priority they are:
(a) to enlarge programs, within the framework of the present budget, for the
improvement of the social and economic welfare of American Blacks in order to
ensure continuing development of present trends in the Black movement;
(b) to elaborate and bring into effect a special program designed to perpetuate
division in the Black movement and neutralize the most active groups of leftist
radical organizations representing different social strata of the Black
community: to encourage division in Black circles;
(c) to preserve the present climate which inhibits the emergence from within the
Black leadership of a person capable of exerting nationwide appeal;
(d) to work out and realize preventive operations in order to impede durable
ties between U.S Black organizations and radical groups in African states;
(e) to support actions designed to sharpen social stratification in the Black
community which would lead to the widening and perpetuation of the gap between
successful educated Blacks and the poor, giving rise to growing antagonism
between different Black groups and a weakening of the movement as a whole.
(f) to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of Black business by granting
government contracts and loans with favorable terms to Black businessmen;
(g) to take every possible means through the AFL-CIO leaders to counteract the
increasing influence of Black labor organizations which function in all major
unions and in particular, the National Coalition of Black Trade Union and its
leadership including the creation of real preference for adverse and hostile
reaction among White trade unionists to demands for improvement of social and
economic welfare of the Blacks;
(h) to support the nomination at federal and local levels of loyal Black public
figures to elective offices, to government agencies and the Court.
This would promote the achievement of a twofold purpose:
first, it would be easier to control the activity of loyal black representatives
within existing institution;
second, the idea of an independent black political party now under discussion
within black leadership circles would soon lose all support.